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PRECLUSION, DUE PROCESS, AND THE RIGHT TO
OPT OUT OF CLASS ACTIONS
Samuel Issacharoff3
A debate over due process has lurked near the surface of class
actions for quite some time. The foundations of a constitutional constraint on class actions may be seen in landmark cases, such as Hansberiy v. Lee,' in which the ability of an individual to be bound by
representative litigation implicates a due process standard for adequate representation. 2 Similarly, strains of due process emerge in the3
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor,
and particularly in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.,4 in which the capacity to
bind future litigants or involuntary participants in a limited fund was
heavily conditioned by an overriding concern over the quality of representation afforded in litigation in absentia. 5 Most notably, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,6 due process was directly invoked to restrict
the ability of courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over out-ofstate absent class members unless individual notice and an ability to
7
opt out are provided.
In each of these cases, however, due process is considered inferentially as either a backdrop to the structure of class action rules or as
a framing point for dealing with the paradox of consent jurisdiction
* 'Harold IL Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia Law
School.

1 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
2

Id. at 45-46.

3 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
4 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
5 See id. at 864 (finding the limited fund class action mechanism unavailable
because "the representation of class members by counsel also representing excluded
plaintiffs . . . precluded adequate structural protection by subclass treatment");
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-27 (1997) (finding the disparity
between currently injured and exposure-only class plaintiffs too great to satisfy Rule
23(a) (4)'s requirement that named parties "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class").
6 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
7 Id. at 806-14.
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under the post-International Shoe 8 approach to personal jurisdiction
cases. Absent from these decisions is a direct confrontation with the
nature of the class action as a state-created mechanism for binding
absent parties to a judgment. 9 If we are to return to an older, more
formal conception of a legal claim as a chose in which a distinct property interest accrues, 10 the due process implications of class action
judgments is brought into sharper relief. A class action is simply,
when all else is stripped away, a state-created procedural device for
extinguishing claims of individuals held at quite a distance from the
"day in court" ideal of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Regardless of
whether a case is won or lost, or (more likely) settled along the way,
the class action serves to provide closure and repose across the aggregated individual claims. To the extent that we may identify a legal
entitlement in an individual's ability to assert and control the prosecution of a cognizable legal claim, the state sponsorship of the class
mechanism must, at the very least, implicate due process issues. Following the logic of this argument, a case can be made that due process
may be satisfied only when, as with the consent to personal jurisdiction under Shutts, an absent class member is insured notice and the
ability to opt out.1
This formal account is not altogether satisfying for at least three
reasons. First, in a broad swath of cases it is difficult to identify an
individual chose, even where a cause of action might lie. Thus, in cases
for injunctive relief against institutional conduct, it is difficult to conceptualize an individual right of autonomy, even where we would no
doubt recognize an individual's ability to bring a claim in court. In
such circumstances, an individual may be an exemplar of the harm
visited by allegedly wrongful institutional conduct, but that same individual cannot claim an autonomous right to separate control of the
outcome of the legal challenge. To give but the most obvious example, a school desegregation challenge may or may not succeed, but if
8 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing a test for personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts within a state).
9 See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv.

2119, 2144-48 (2000) (viewing class actions as "state-enabled litigation").
10 See Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation,75 TEX. L.
REv. 571, 585-89 (1997) (treating a cause of action as a chose, a form of property
protected by the Due Process Clause).
11 I have previously argued that the emergence of a robust inquiry into the adequacy of representation pursuant to Amchem and Ortiz brings the rules-based certification inquiry into alignment with the constitutional due process demands of
representative actions. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of
Class Actions, 1999 Sup. CT. REV. 337, 353.
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it does it will establish the wrongful conduct directed across a group of
affected school children. In such cases, which are formed under Rule
23(b) (2) ,12 it would be nonsensical to claim that any one child has an
autonomous right to an independent outcome of the litigation.
While each aggrieved child is deemed to have standing to bring a
claim for wrongful deprivation of a claimed right to integrated
schools, no child has an individual stake in the outcome of that litigatfon separate from that of the other similarly situated children.
Similarly, there is little realistic prospect for individual control of
claims in cases in which a group of claimants is seeking recompense
from a limited fund, as contemplated under Rule 23(b) (1).13 This is a
common problem when individuals may have a claim for compensation, but the limitation on the corpus of available funds requires ajust
assessment of their claims measured not only in terms of an abstract
right against a defendant, but also by comparison to other potential
claimants. There are colorful historical precedents, as when a warship
returning victorious to harbor must have a mechanism to clear ac4
counts and divide the war booty according to a binding allocation.'
There are also numerous more prosaic examples, as when a group of
injured parties is seeking recovery from an insufficient reservoir of
insurance proceeds.' 5 The fact that each individual's capacity to recover is dependent on the other plaintiffs means that there no longer
can be an individual right of autonomy in pursuing claims against the
defendant. As with the claim for injunctive relief, no individual has a
divisible claim, even though all have standing to bring suit.
Second, there is a strategic reason to doubt the importance of the
individual right to control one's litigation destiny. One of the prime
reasons for the development of the class action is the insufficiency of
resources of individual litigants facing a common course of conduct
by a repeat actor. In such cases, the "negative value" of any individual
claim defeats the prospect for meaningful individual enforcement of
even well-established, meritorious claims. The concept of the negative value claim is most often applied when the value of the claim is

12 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2).
13 Id. 23(b)(1).
14 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS AcTION 182-83 (1987); Robert G. Bone, Personal and ImpersonalLitigativeForms:
Reconceiving the Histo.y of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REv. 213, 243 & n.63
(1990).
15 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 747-48 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding certification of a limited fund class for distribution of insurance policy proceeds).
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itself is too small to justify the cost of prosecution.' 6 But it applies as
well when the multiple exposure of the defendant creates an incentive
to expend resources in litigation that would overwhelm any individual
litigant, even if the amount of the claim would conceivably justify oneon-one litigation. 17 As a result, an individual litigant who is unlikely to
sue outside an aggregate action is similarly unlikely to exercise a right
to opt out into the domain of unviable individual claims. Whatever
the broader teachings of class action jurisprudence, with Amchem the
most significant recent addition, one clear tenet is that the exit option
of exclusion from the class cannot serve standing alone as the guarantor of equity in the class action setting.
Third, there is increasing skepticism over the view that a class action is simply an unaltered aggregation of individual claims. Courts
are well aware that the decision to certify or not radically alters the
incentive structure of litigation, as reflected in the creation of the interlocutory appeal mechanisms of Rule 23(f). 18 Classes do take on the
form of an "entity," to borrow Professor Shapiro's term from an earlier volume of this law review, 19 with rather immediate consequences
for the prospect of successful prosecution of a claim. 20 In light of the
strategic implications of class certification, it is difficult to reduce the
due process concerns to simply a question whether something approx2
imating an individual right of action may be recreated. '
16 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions
also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually.").
17 See David Rosenberg, OfEnd Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases:Lessons from
a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 709-10 (1989) (outlining the advantages to defendants in the individual litigation of potential class action claims).

18

FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(f).

19 David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 917 (1998) (arguing that "the notion of class as entity should prevail over
more individually oriented notions of aggregate litigation" (emphasis added)).
20 This may be seen from both the vantage point of the class and the defendant.
In many negative value cases, the failure to certify the class is rightly seen as the
"death knell" of the case. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470-71
(1978) (recognizing that refusing to certify a class "may induce a plaintiff to abandon
his individual claim"). By contrast, the aggregation of claims may dramatically alter
the ability to risk litigation in a "bet the ranch" mass case, as argued by Judge Posner
in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the
"sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to the individual
actions pending or likely, exposes [the defendant]").
21 I leave aside the broader implications of Shapiro's claim that the entity status
of a class action should permit certain binding decisions to be taken on behalf of
absent class members. This issue is addressed elsewhere. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee, Jr.,
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Nonetheless, the right to opt out may have great significance.
The clearest example is in the mass tort context. This is the arena in
which individual claims are likely to have the greatest potential value
22
and in which the capacity to opt out is likely to be most meaningful.
In the highly publicized fen-phen litigation, for example, a mass tort
settlement was approved based on the ability to opt out not only initially but also on the "back end."23 The fact that the settlement provided for a right of exit into the tort system should an individual's
drug-induced harm progress to serious levels was a critical ingredient
in securing judicial approval of the settlement. 24 As opposed to the
low value claim, or even the unknown prospect of future harm, each
of which may be thought to engender "rational indifference" on the
part of the bulk of the affected class, 2 5 high value claims of salient
harms will likely provoke great vigilance on the part of class members.
When the vigilance is combined with the right to opt out, the prospect

Class Action Accountability: ReconcilingExit, Voice, and Loyalty in RepresentativeLitigation,

100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 438 (2000). See generally Issacharoff, supra note 11.
22 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. Rxv. 1343, 1447, 1465 (1995) (stressing the importance of the right to opt
out in mass tort cases); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
805, 833 (1997) (focusing on "preserving the forms of individual participation-most
critically, a meaningful right to opt out of class actions").
23 See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12275, at *63 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (describing the "back-end opt out" right as an
option for class members whose illness progresses to a serious level to receive compensation according to the settlement or to "pursue their claim for compensatory
damages.., in the tort system without any time bar"). I must disclose that I participated in this ligitation.
24 See id. at *119 (certifying mass tort class action in part because "the instant
settlement's intermediate and back-end opt out rights allow class members to make
informed choices about whether to remain in or opt out of the settlement"); see also
Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115
HAuv. L. REv. 747, 796-97 (2001) (describing the back-end opt out in the fen-phen
settlement as a put option). But see David Rosenberg, Mandato-LitigationClass Action: The Only Optionfor Mass Tort Cases, 115 HAsv. L. REv. 831, 835-38, 841-43 (2001)
(criticizing Nagareda in favor of an ex ante approach to measures of fairness in
settlement).
25 See Coffee, supra note 22, at 1362-63 ("[B] ecause only a relatively small percentage of individuals exposed to most toxic substances will actually develop compensable physical injuries, members of the future claimant class can be expected to be
rationally apathetic about their future legal rights .... ").
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for exit is quite meaningful, 2 6 as evident in such high profile mass tort
27
examples as the breast implant litigation.
The Supreme Court's engagement with asbestos litigation in the
recent Amchem and Ortiz cases has drawn much attention to the role of
class actions encompassing high value individual claims. The most significant recent addition to this literature is by Professor Richard
Nagareda, who relies on the fen-phen settlement to endorse non-coercive mass settlements that generate the equivalent of "put options" for
potential future claimants. 28 My focus here is different and addresses
a less explored implication of the right to opt out. Here my attention
is not so much on the high value cases, such as the mass tort, but on
class actions in which the bulk of the class has claims that are unlikely
to merit individual prosecution. I want to suggest that the right to opt
out may be of considerable significance in this context, although not
necessarily because of a meaningful exit strategy from the class.
Rather, the right of exit may be thought of as significant not because
of the prospect of individual removal from any particular case, but
instead, because of its impact on the preclusive effect of class action
litigation. The argument proceeds in two parts. First, I want to examine the case law surrounding the right to opt out of a class action as
a determinant of the future preclusive effects of ajudgment on absent
class members. The key case here is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. 29 and the key insight is the inability to
preclude future individual claims unless class members have been afforded an opportunity to opt out in the initial class action. I then
apply the rationale of Ticor to the current dispute over the scope of
26 For an analysis of class action governance using the concepts of "exit, voice and
loyalty" inherited from Albert 0. Hirschman's classic work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Responses To Decline in Firms, Organizations,and States, see LINDAJ. SILBERMAN & ALLAN
R. STEIN, CrVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRAcIrCE 897 (2001) (structuring presenta-

tion of class action practice around problems of exit, voice and loyalty); see also Coffee, supra note 21, at 438 (concluding that a strategy of enhancing "exit" should
outperform alternative efforts aimed at improving either client "voice" or agent "loyalty"); Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 341-42.
27

See In re Silicone Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (noting that approximately
7800 persons in the United States and approximately 6500 persons outside the United
States had opted out of the settlement); see also Nagareda, supranote 24, at 751; Steve
Baughman, Note, Class Actions in the Asbestos Context: Balancing the Due Process Considerations Implicated by the Right To Opt Out, 70 TEx. L. REv. 211, 221-25 (1991) (arguing for

the importance of opt-out rights for class members who have "suffered injuries disproportionately greater than the class average").
28 Nagareda, supra note 24, at 747.
29

982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Rule 23(b) (2) certification in the employment discrimination context. Second, I want to look at the emerging cause of action for medical monitoring to show a direct application of the limitations on the
preclusive effects of class actions that do not afford an individual right
of exit. The conclusion will then focus on the nature of the class action certification as determining its future preclusive effects on absent
class members.
I. DUE PROCESS AND PRECLUSION
A.

Limiting the PreclusiveEffect of Class Actions

Much of the focus on the right to opt out arises from the increasingly "adventuresome" use of class actions as an attempt to secure closure to mass exposure claims . 0 In Ortiz, for example, the Court
struck down an attempt to create a litigation-generated limited fund
that would have bound all potential asbestos claimants, to recovery
from within a single action and all without a right to opt out. 31 Although the Court rejected the proposed settlement as falling outside
the constrained ambit of a true limited fund,3 2 the proposed settlement nonetheless served to highlight the precarious quality of the
right of exit, and the attempt to terminate future legal claims without
any capacity for individual control of legal claims. Indeed, Ortiz may
derive its inspiration from the fact that, in the mass tort context, the
right of exit has shown itself to be a significant guarantor that the
constitutional and rule-based requirements of adequate representation are met.3 3 As expressed by Professor Coffee, "[m] uch less should
need to be shown to demonstrate adequate representation where
there is an effective exit than where the class is a mandatory one from
34
which exit is not permitted."
Even accepting the limitation that Ortiz places on the use of the.
limited fund class action, the question remains as to the source of the
differentiation in process protections offered to absent class members
in mandatory, as opposed to non-mandatory, classes. In order to ad30 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-18 (1997) ("In the decades
since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, class-action practice has become ever more 'adventuresome' as a means of coping with claims too numerous to secure their 'just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination' one by one." (internal citation omitted)).
31 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999).
32 Id. at 864-65.
33 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-14 (1985) (holding
that Kansas's procedure of using first-class mail to send notice that explained the right
to opt out satisfied due process).
34 Coffee, supra note 21, at 428.
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dress this question directly, we must return to the initial formulation
of the inquiry in Shutts. Shutts begins by addressing the unique problem of how a court may acquire jurisdiction over absent class members
whose claims are not transactionally related to the jurisdiction. Were
the absent class members required to affirmatively consent to the jurisdiction of the court, the class action would cease to be a viable
mechanism for aggregating geographically-dispersed small claims
cases. 35 The transaction costs of securing individual consent would
significantly compromise the aggregative efficiency of the class action.
Hence, Shutts inverts the inquiry from that required of a defendant.
Rather than affirmatively consent to jurisdiction, absent plaintiffs
must only be afforded the opportunity to register their lack of consent, and any ensuing silence will be construed as an acceptance of
the court's jurisdiction: " [D] ue process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself
from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for
exclusion' form to the court."3 6
While Shutts opened the due process inquiry, it is generally seen
as having done so for the limited purpose of resolving the problem of
personal jurisdiction. 37 Nonetheless, Shutts introduces a critical qualifier by announcing its rule of personal jurisdiction as applying only to
cases "wholly or predominantly for money judgments."3 8 The clear
implication is that where a claim cannot be thought to belong to an
individual plaintiff, even if only as a hypothetical matter, the due process consideration did not arise. 39 Viewed in this light, the Shutts rule
35 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985).
36 Id. at 812.
37 As Henry Monaghan points out, "Shutts's opt-out right is limited to contexts in
which [the court] would not otherwise have a basis for in personam jurisdiction."
Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident
Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1168 (1998). Newberg focuses his discussion

on whether opt-out rights serve as a substitute for minimum contacts as a way of ensuringjurisdiction. 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONIrE, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcTIONS
§ 1.20, at 1-48 (3d ed. 1992). Miller and Crump suggest viewing Shutts as a case about
distant forum abuse and point out that a forum can "force a class member to litigate
in the action if that member or the object of the action has sufficient contacts with the
forum," a holding, they claim, "isimplicit in the common rights and limited fund
class cases." Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdictionand Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YAE L.J. 1, 52 & n.369

(1986).
38

Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3.

39

See, e.g., In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d

760, 769 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Shutts right to opt out attaches to class

actions involving "both important injunctive relief and damage claims" (emphasis added)). But see Waldron v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 124 F.R.D. 235, 238 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
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is an attempt to strike a balance between class actions that are primarily the amalgamation of individual claims and those. that represent
claims that only exist in the aggregated collective. 40 With regard to
the former, the day in court ideal of individual control still holds
sway,4 1 whereas with the latter, the individual litigant is truly simply a
representative for the affected class.
Viewed in this light, Shutts invites an expansion of the due process rationale to permit binding class members to preclusive resolution of their individually-defined damages claims only if they have
been afforded the right to opt out. As expressed by Professor
Monaghan, "Recognition of a substantive due process right to opt out
of at least some damage claims has considerable plausibility. It would
limit the threat posed by modem aggregation practice to our longstanding tradition of individual litigation autonomy."42 The reasoning for providing the right to opt out in Rule 23(b) (3) class actions
may therefore be recast mildly as a recognition of at least a formal
right to litigant autonomy in cases that could plausibly be cast as
stand-alone claims for recompense. 43 By contrast, the impossibility of
disentangling an autonomous individual claim from the limited fund
or injunctive class action explains both the impracticability of a right
("[A] mandatory class action would violate the constitutional rights of those persons
who have insufficient contacts to allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
them.").
40 See George Rutherglen, BetterLate Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement
Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 258, 281 (1996).
41 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
42 Monaghan, supra note 37, at 1174; see also Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The ConstitutionalLimits ofJudicialRulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated UnderFederalRule 23, 39 ARiuz. L. REv. 461, 472 (1997) (arguing that
an opt-out right is necessary to the historic recognition of individual entitlements and
responsibilities and the centrality of "the right to assert one's own rights").
43 Herbert Newberg states the traditional rationale for the opt-out right in
23(b) (3) actions: "When a smill segment of class members has a strong interest in
individual litigation, that interest may be served by opting out of the suit. . . ." 1
NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 37, § 4.29, at 4-114. In their treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright, Miller, and Kane explain the history of the right to opt
out as it emerged from the "spurious" class actions of pre-1966 federal procedure:
By requiring the absentee to take affirmative action to avoid being bound,
the rule attempts to eliminate the common practice in "spurious" class suits
prior to 1966 of waiting to see if the adjudication was favorable to the class
before deciding whether to enter the action. Furthermore, the opt-out procedure in the amended rule preserves the right of a potential class member
who feels that his interests are in conflict with or antagonistic to the other
class members to bring his own action ....
7B CHARLFS ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1787, at 210-11
(2d ed. 1986).
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of individual exit and the absence of a formal opt-out procedure
under Rule 23.
Thus, the unstated assumption of Shutts appears to be that in
cases which were not "wholly or predominantly for money judgmints," personal jurisdiction would attach based on the defendant,
and would in turn implicate no corresponding due process inquiry
about absent class members. 44 What remain unexplored are those
cases in which there are elements that raise collective injunctive
claims for relief and potential individual damages claims by absent
class members. The logic of Shutts would indicate that in such cases a
due process right to opt out is a prerequisite for a binding judgment
as to the damages claims, but not as to the injunctive component.
The effect of focusing on the preclusive nature of the judgment is to
disaggregate the two components of the case and to allow a binding
judgment on some claims, but not others.
The clear example here is the Ninth Circuit's handling of Brown
v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,45 a case that unfortunately had certiorari

dismissed on the very issue at the core of this Article. 4 6 Ticor concerned the preclusive effect of a settlement for injunctive and other
equitable relief in an antitrust class action arising from a consolidated
multidistrict litigation (MDL) proceeding. 47 The class was certified
under Rule 23 subsections (b) (1) and (2), and the settlement was upheld on appeal to the Third Circuit.48 Shortly thereafter, class actions
44 Wright, Miller, and Kane take the position that there is no due process requirement of a right to opt out of mandatory class actions. "The preferred view should be
that Shutts does not foreclose the possibility of binding absent members who do not

receive notice and thus the opportunity to opt out when the court has adopted a
reasonable notice scheme." Id. § 1789, at 43-44 (2d ed. Supp. 2001). Wright, Miller,
and Kane base this argument on their reading of Shutts as "setting forth... requirements only for Rule 23(b) (3) damage suits, and not as suggesting that similar restraints may be placed on other class actions." Id. at 256 (2d ed. 1986); see also In re
Cherry's Petition to Intervene, 164 F.R.D. 630, 636-37 (E.D. Mich. 1996). In White v.
NationalFootball League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993), the district court similarly

held that Shutts does not apply in cases where claims for injunctive relief
predominate, whatever the accompanying damage claims, and pointed out that where
other procedural safeguards, including adequate representation and notice, are used,
opt out is not constitutionally required. Id. at 1410-12.
45 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
46

The Court subsequently dismissed another suit on which it had granted certio-

rari to address this question, finding that the federal question was insufficiently
presented by the state courts. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997).
47 Ticor, 982 F.2d at 390.

48

See In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., MDL Docket No.

633, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24435, at *31-*34, *72 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1986), afjd
without opinion by 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1987).
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were filed on behalf of consumers in Arizona 49 and Wisconsin 50 claiming actual damages as a result of the same price fixing activity as had
been challenged in the Third Circuit MDL proceeding.5 1 The Ticor
defendants then attempted to defend on the grounds of res judicata 5 2 arguing that the claims being asserted had already been
pressed or could have been pressed in the prior litigation.5 3 At the
heart of the res judicata argument was the question whether a class
member could be barred in seeking individual damages by a class action from which she had never been afforded the opportunity to opt
54

OUL

According to the Ninth Circuit, the absence of an opt-out provision was dispositive. Extending the due process argument of Shutts,
the court found that
[b] ecause Brown had no opportunity to opt out of the MDL 633
litigation ....there would be a violation of minimal due process if

Brown's damage claims were held barred by resjudicata. Brown will
be bound by the injunctive relief provided by the settlement in
MDL 633, and foreclosed from seeking other or further injunctive
will not bar Brown's claims for
relief in this case, but res judicata
55
Ticor.
against
damages
monetary
Ticor may be thought of as anticipating the rationale of Ortiz to
limit the coercive capacity of class actions from which the exit option
was not even a theoretical possibility. As one lower court expressed
this approach: "In a class action in which unnamed plaintiff class
members are not permitted the opportunity to opt out, an unnamed
plaintiff class member is not bound by that portion of a settlement
which purports to preclude further claims for damages based on the
same facts encompassed by the litigation. '5 6 The key to this approach
is to divide the world of aggregate litigation between those claims that
would, absent transaction costs and considerations of efficiency, be49

Ticor, 982 F.2d at 389-90.

50 Id.
51 Id. at 388.
52 Under the standard formulation of res judicata, a lawsuit involving the same
parties and based upon the same underlying cause of action as that asserted in a
previous case is barred, as are all claims that were raised or could have been raised in
the earlier proceeding. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5
(1979).
53 See Ticor, 982 F.2d at 390.
54 See id. at 392.
55 Id.
56

Clarke v. Advanced Private Networks, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 521, 522 (D. Nev. 1997).
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long to individuals on the one hand, and those in which individuals
cannot be thought of independent of the collectivity.
B.

Confusing Certificationwith Preclusion

Despite the general approval of Ticor, the case law has not integrated the distinction in class actions based on the preclusive effects
of the case. The reason is that although Ticor deals with the preclusive
effects of mandatory class actions, it also reflects a view as to when a
class action should be certified as Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2) even when
damage claims are raised (or foreclosed by settlement). This issue
stems from the decree in Shutts that opt-out rights should be available
57
in claims that are "wholly or predominately for money judgments."
The lower courts have generally interpreted and applied the requirement to focus on the form of class certification rather than on the
preclusive effect of the certification. Thus, in cases that raise issues of
both injunctive relief and monetary damages, courts have attempted
to determine which component is paramount. The result is a "predominance" test asking whether the monetary claims predominate
over the claims for equitable relief, thus requiring notice and opt out,
or whether the monetary claims are merely incidental to the equitable
relief.58 This, in turn, leads to a division on the courts as to location
of the dividing line so as to determine the extent to which a claim for
57 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985).
58 See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir.
2001).
[W]e hold that when presented with a motion for (b) (2) class certification
of a claim seeking both injunctive relief and non-incidental monetary damages, a district court must "consider" the evidence presented at a class certification hearing and the arguments of counsel, and then assess whether
(b) (2) certification is appropriate in light of "the relative importance of the
remedies sought, given all of the facts and circumstances of the case."
Id.; Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The district
court must squarely face and resolve the question whether the money damages sought
by the plaintiff class are more than incidental to the equitable relief in view."); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Courts have generally permitted (b) (2) classes to recover monetary relief in addition to declaratory or injunctive
relief, at least where the monetary relief does not predominate."); In re A.H.Robins
Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 197
F.R.D. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
In any such action in which both injunctive and monetary relief [are]
sought, the inherently individualized nature of the determination of damages . . .render[s] it predominant, and thereby makes class action status
under Rule 23(b) (2) inappropriate, except in those rare incidences in which
the request for monetary relief [is] wholly "incidental" to the requested injunctive relief.
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monetary relief is sufficiently central to the case as to take it out of the
Rule 23(b) (2) category of certification. 59
The clearest example comes with the current circuit split on the
availability of Rule 23 (b) (2) certification for employment discrimination class actions. Not so long ago, claims of disparate impact resulting from an employer's hiring or promotional policies were
considered the very backbone of the Rule 23(b) (2) class action for
equitable relief.60 In 1991, however, Congress amended Title VII to
allow, for the first time, civil rights claimants to seek legal, as opposed
to equitable, relief, including "future pecuniary losses, emotional
pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other nonpecuniary losses." 61 The immediate effect of the

creation of legal damages remedies was to trigger the right to trial by
jury in all Title VII cases that sought the full spectrum of available
relief. As summarized in the most significant post-1991 Tite VII class
action case, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Id. See generally 1 NEvBERG & CoNIE, supra note 37, § 4.14, at 4-48 to 4-49; Lesley
Frieder Wolf, Note, EvadingFriendlyFire:Achieving Class CertificationAfter the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1847, 1853-55 (2000) (analyzing different courts'
treatment of the predominance issue after the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Robert L.
Serenka, Jr., Annotation, Propriety of Allowing Class Member to Opt Out in Class Action
Certfied Under Subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2) of Rule 23 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
146 A.L.R. FED. 563 (1998) (analyzing different courts' approaches to the predominance test).
59 For example, some courts require that the monetary claims be incidental to
the main claims for equitable relief. See Jefferson, 195 F.3d at.898; Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). Other courts look to the extent
that the claims of individual class members are cohesive in determining whether the
class as a whole or individual members deserve the right to opt out. See, e.g., Eubanks,
110 F.3d at 98; County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1305 (2d
Cir. 1990); Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1160 (11th Cir. 1983); Arnold v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 452 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Sometimes
the court will simply not certify the case if it is determined that claims for monetary
relief predominate. See, e.g., Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum.Corp., 165 F.RLD. 463, 469
(W.D. La. 1995), affd sub nom. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th
Cir. 1998); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 579, 583 (D.NJ.
1986). At least one court simply considers the relative importance of the claims on an
ad hoc basis even when the monetary damages claim is "non-incidental." See Robinson,
267 F.3d at 162-67. Finally, in some cases, the predominance test has little meaning
since some courts have characterized money damages as equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Hynson v. Drummond Coal Co., 601 A.2d 570, 575 (Del. Ch. 1991) (certifying a securities class action under provisions identical to Rule 23 subsections (b) (1) and (b) (2)
even though the claim was solely for money damages because the "particularities of
any holder would have no bearing on the appropriate remedy").
60 E.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 409; Robinson, 267 F.3d at 169.
61 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (1994).
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Corp., " [bly injecting jury trials into the Title VII mix, the 1991 Act
introduced, in the context of class actions, potential manageability
problems with both practical and legal, indeed constitutional,
62
implications."
For the Allison court, the result was to restrict the application of
the Rule 23(b) (2) class action "to focus on cases where broad, classwide injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary." 6 3 Accordingly, a
class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) could recover only "incidental"
damages, defined as "damages that flow directly from liability to the
class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or
declaratory relief," that are "capable of computation by means of
objective standards and not dependent in any significant way on the
intangible, subjective differences of each class member's circumstances." 64 Because the damages authorized by the 1991 Act fell
outside this range, the Fifth Circuit rejected the certification of a
broad-scale challenge to alleged discriminatory employment prac65
tices.
Allison was immediately seen as the "death-knell" of employment
discrimination class actions. 66 The response was to challenge, incorrectly in my view, Allison on what it meant for class-wide issues to
predominate. In the most significant of the post-Allison cases, the Second Circuit's decision in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Co., 67 the court rejected the incidental damages theory in favor of an
"ad hoc balancing" to determine whether the injunctive and declara62 Allison, 151 F.3d at 410.
63 Id. at 412.
64 Id. at 415; see also Bolin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing the definition of incidental damages provided in Allison, 151 F.3d at
415).
65 See Allison, 151 F.3d at 407, 425-26.
66 See, e.g., Reap v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536, 548 (D.N.J. 2001) (following
Allison in denying class certification because discrimination claims would inherently

involve individual hearings to determine damages); Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods.
Corp., 198 F.R.D. 638, 642 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that damages claims would re-

quire individual examinations and therefore did not meet Allison's objective standards test); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D. Me. 2000) (finding class
action certification inappropriate in discrimination claims where the plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages and also demands right to jury). See generally
Nikaa BaughJordan, Comment, Allison v. Citgo Petroleum: TheDeathKnell for the Title
VII Class Action?, 51 ALA. L. REV. 847, 867-81 (2000) (analyzing the effects of Allison
on class certification of discrimination claims); Wolf, supra note 58, at 1852 ("In the

wake of this decision, there is reason to believe that class certification has become an
impossibility where employment discrimination plaintiffs seek damages, injunctive relief, and to exercise their right to demand ajury trial.").
67 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).

2002]

PRECLUSION,

DUE PROCESS,

AND

THE RIGHT TO OPT

OUT

1071

tory components of the relief sought predominated. 68 Relying on the
power of district courts to certify issues or parts of claims for class
treatment under Rule 23 (c) (4) (A) ,69 the court allowed for class certification of Title VII claims so long as "(1) 'the positive weight or value
[to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensatory or punitive damages are also
claimed,' ...

and (2) class treatment would be efficient and managea-

70
ble, thereby achieving an appreciable measure ofjudicial economy."
The "ad hoc balancing" test of Robinson fails to engage fully the
concerns of Allison for at least two reasons. First, it is not clear how a
court would actually handle a case in which a class of substantial size
sought the type of highly individualized damages anticipated by the
1991 amendments to Title VII. Allowing certification under Rule
23(b) (2) may evade the manageability requirement for certification
under Rule 23(b) (3), but it does not circumvent the nagging issue of
what exactly a court is supposed to do if the 1300 members of the
Robinion class were actually to attempt to press their claims for compensatory relief before a jury. 71 Even were the class to be certified,
what would an actual trial look like if 1300 class members were to
attempt to put on proof of their emotional distress? The practical
answer is that few cases are likely to reach that point. Nonetheless, the
stewardship of a court over a certified class implicates some concern
about how individual claims will be tried.
More significantly, Robinson does little to reconcile the presumptive collective quality of the relief sought in injunctive claims with the
individualized notion of the recovery allowed under amended Title
VII. Although the court relies on rather circular claims that Rule
23(b) (2) actions may rely on a "presumption of cohesion and unity

between absent class members and the class representatives," 72 the

court adds little about how that presumed coherence diminishes in
any significant way the individualized character of the damages asserted. The class may be cohesive in its standing with relation to the
68
69

Id. at 164.
Id. at 167.

70 Id. at 164 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting)).
71 This would then lead to a confrontation with another body of Fifth Circuit law,
the reading of the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment as prohibiting
the bifurcation of review between two different juries. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293
(7th Cir. 1995). But see Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment
Reexamination Clause, 83 IowA L. REv. 499 (1998) (arguing that jury issues can be
sufficiently severed as to not offend the Seventh Amendment).
72 Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165.
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defendant-the core definitional requirement of a Rule 23(b) (2)
class action-but the remedial phase of the litigation threatens to
push very far beyond the presumption that the damages would flow
directly from the equitable order directed against the defendant. 73
For purposes of this Article, however, what is of greatest interest is
the court's recognition that the existence of damages claims, while
not a bar to certification, nonetheless presents "due process risks
posed by Rule 23(b) (2) class certification of claims for damages. '74
Here the court returns full circle to the initial problem by, in effect,
transforming the Rule 23(b) (2) class into a Rule 23(b) (3) action:
[W] here non-incidental monetary relief such as compensatory damages are involved, due process may require the enhanced procedural protections of notice and opt out for absent class members. This
is because entitlement to non-incidental damages may vary among
class members depending on the circumstances and merits of each
claim. The presumption of class homogeneity and cohesion falters,
and thus, adequate representation alone may prove insufficient to
protect absent class members' interests. 75
The resulting Second Circuit standard strikes me as needlessly
complex. The core of the difficulty comes from attempting to circumvent the logic of Allison by creating a rather rudderless "ad hoc" standard and then grafting onto it a series of due process limitations of
unknown dimensions. At some level this must have been apparent to
the Robinson court, for the term "ad hoc balancing" is usually a term of
derision for unprincipled adjudication rather than a label for an inquiry of constitutional dimensions. The same result could have been
73 In this regard, the 1991 amendments to Title VII changed the landscape in two
significant ways. Prior to 1991, the remedies were limited to the harms caused directly by the defendant's unlawful conduct. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, in a typical refusal to hire case, the defendant
would be forced to pay the amount of back pay owing to the class of potential employees. This would remove any subjective inquiry as to the anguish or any other subjective harm incurred by the employee. Second, the fact these remedies were deemed
equitable meant that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury was not implicated. Id. at 410. Thus, the remedial phase of a Title VII disparate impact case was
left to what was termed a "Phase II"proceeding in which there would be an administrative calculation of damages to those employees who would actually have been hired
in the absence of the unlawful pattern or practice. The parties, or a special master, or
a magistrate, or even the supervising judge could then examine the administrative
record to determine whether the back-pay awards should be offset by other wages,
transfer payments, or revenues during the class period and, if so, what the extent of
the offset would be. Because there was no jury impanelled, this process could take an
extended period of time and be reviewed as the administrative record was created.
74 Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165.
75 Id. at 165-66.
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achieved far more economically by applying the logic of Ticor to address the certification question through the prism of the potential
preclusive scope of the class action. The Robinson court could simply
have limited the certification to a class claiming injunctive relief and
those forms of readily quantifiable back-pay claims as would have created a non-objectionable class under Title VII as it stood prior to the
1991 amendments. The scope of the class would also limit its preclusive effect to only those non-individually based claims to which, under
the court's view, no independent due process concerns would attach.
Under the facts of the case, which asserted racially disparate results
from insufficient oversight of supervisory power to discipline, 76 it is
exceedingly unlikely that there would have been any individual damages claims meriting individual prosecution. But absent a clear doctrine on the resjudicata effect of a Rule 23(b) (2) class action, diligent
plaintiffs' counsel would have felt compelled to assert all possible remedies for the class members for fear of waiving valuable individual
claims of some of the class members. Were the court to have followed
Ticor, however, this problem could have been avoided. The certification would have been limited to those claims that actually fit the Rule
23(b) (2) model, leaving individuals free to pursue their separate
claims should individual class members (and presumably other lawyers) find that these claims merited individual prosecution.
II. A CASE ExAiLE: MEDICAL MONITORING
To return to the main theme, Ticor draws an important distinction between the types of remedies available in Rule 23(b) (2) class
actions as opposed to Rule 23(b) (3) class actions and the range of
preclusive power of the respective class action devices. The inability
to opt out is significant, but not necessarily because individual class
members may or may not wish to pursue the action subjudice on their
own. Rather, the difference in treatment of the two types of class actions arises from an important distinction in the nature of the claim
between those that truly inhere in the collective entity of the class and
those that are merely an aggregation of what might otherwise be selfsustaining individual causes of action.
The focus on the preclusive effect of a class action actually serves
to resolve some of the contentious issues in class action practice today.
In this Part, I want to focus on the preclusive effect of ajudgment in a
Rule 23(b) (2) class action in order to give greater content to the significant but relatively recent type of aggregate claim generally termed
76

Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter RR. Co., 197 F.R.D. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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"medical monitoring." 77 The purchase from assessing different class
actions in terms of their preclusive effects can be gleaned from an
examination of the emerging claim for medical monitoring in response to a mass toxic exposure. The basic insight behind the medical monitoring class action is set forth in an important early case from
the Utah Supreme Court, Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.7 8:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding
through a red light. Jones lands on his head with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine whether he
has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests prove negative,
but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the substantial
cost of the diagnostic examinations.
From our example, it is clear that even in the absence of physical
injury Jones ought to be able to recover the cost for the various
diagnostic examinations proximately caused by Smith's negligent
action. A cause of action allowing recovery for the expense of diagnostic examinations recommended by competent physicians will, in
theory, deter misconduct, whether it be negligent motorbike riding
or negligent aircraft manufacture. The cause of action also accords
with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice which underlie the common law of tort. The motorbike rider, through his negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the opinion of medical experts, to

need specific medical services-a cost that is neither inconsequential nor of a kind the community generally accepts as part of the

wear and tear of daily life. Under these principles of tort law, the
79
motorbiker should pay.

77 See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34
WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 1057, 1063-71 (1999).

78 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
79 Id. at 977-78 (quoting Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990) (Paoli 1) (recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring absent physical injury); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823
(Cal. 1993) ("[W]e conclude that a reasonably certain need for medical monitoring is
an item of damage for which compensation should be allowed."). As one court expressed the growing view on medical monitoring:
It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoiding
physical injury. When a defendant negligently invades this interest, the injury to which is neither speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary
that the defendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the
examinations.
Friends,746 F.2d at 826; see also Potter, 863 P.2d at 823-24.
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Although the example in Hansenis framed in terms of an injured
individual, the case nonetheless sets out the framework for an aggregate claim of tortious toxic exposure. As the discussion of the hypothetical Jones v. Smith reveals, the real issue in the case is probabilistic.
The determination by medical experts that a particular examination is
necessary is predicated on the likelihood that injuries of the sort observed will be accompanied by harms that may only be detected by
further examination. 80 If that detection in turn could lead to suitable
medical treatment, then the monitoring serves to foreclose tort liability rather than to substitute for it. In other words, the negligence of
the tortfeasor is the occasion for a legal intervention that seeks not
retrospective restoration of the status quo ante, but rather seeks to
determine whether a probability of harm may be reduced to zero by
early medical intervention. 8 1
The departure from classic tort law is two-fold.8 2 First, the purpose of the intervention is to forestall the emergence of a potential
harm occasioned by the defendant's negligence. Thus, there is no
compensatory component to the claim for medical monitoring.8 3 Second, there is an arguable claim for reducing the overall social cost
Recognition that a defendant's conduct has created the need for medical
monitoring does not create a new tort. It is simply a compensable item of
damage when liability is established under traditional tort theories of recovery ....
It would be inequitable for an indivdiual wrongfully exposed to
dangerous toxins .

.

. to have to pay the expense of medical monitoring

when such intervention is clearly reasonable and necessary.

Id.
80 See generally Susan L. Martin &Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actionsfor MedicalMonitoring: Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENvnL. L. 121, 122-32 (1995) (outlining
the elements of a medical monitoring claim); Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitdring:

A Viable Remedy for DeservingPlaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive ConsolationPrize?, 27
WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 521, 523-25 (2000) (describing the historical development of
medical monitoring awards).
81 See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) ("The
availability of a substantial remedy before the consequences of the plaintiffs' exposure
are manifest may also have the beneficial effect of preventing or mitigating serious
future illnesses and thus reduce the overall costs to the responsible parties.").
82 See generally Kara L. McCall, Comment, Medical MonitoringPlaintiffs and Subse-

quent Claimsfor Disease, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 969, 987-88 (1999) (explaining the unique
nature of medical monitoring claims).
83 See Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to Scientiflc Evidence in Toxic Exposure
Cases: Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 Rnv. LITIG. 551, 554 (1998) ("Instead of
compensating toxic exposure plaintiffs for injuries they have yet to manifest, an award
for medical monitoring encourages them to take preventative or early detection measures to protect their long-term health.").
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occasioned by a defendant's negligence. 84 Here it is worth considering the distinction between the medical monitoring claim and the
equally novel, though generally frowned upon claim of fear of disease
following a toxic exposure.8 5 When plaintiffs exposed to a toxin sue
for "fear of cancer," to take the most noteworthy example, they are
seeking an ex ante distribution of the likely harm caused by the totality of the defendant's conduct. In essence, a "fear of cancer" claim is
simply a demand for a distribution of the likely social cost of the defendant's negligence paid to the entirety of the at-risk group rather
than the individuals who ultimately contract the disease suing afterthe-fact. By way of example, the payment of $1000 to 1000 exposed
individuals for fear of disease is the same as the payment of $100,000
to the ten individuals who actually contract the disease. So long as the
probabilistic assessments are accurate, the deterrence objectives of the
tort system are met in either case, as are the compensatory claims of
the affected group as a whole. 8 6 One may argue about the merits of
ex ante versus ex post compensatory systems, but these arguments are
fairly well confined within the core tenets of the tort system.
The probabilistic nature of the harm is directly evident in the
mass toxic exposure cases. Instead of the plaintiff being an identifiable individual whose harms may be greater than immediately apparent, the probabilities attach to the epidemiological likelihood that a
certain number of individuals among the affected group will manifest
pathologies at some future date. As should be evident from the nature of epidemiological proof, there is no difference among the affected class members in terms of proof of harm. All affected
individuals become the basis of the same probabilistic risk of harm.
The key, however, is that there is no effort to provide compensation to
84 See Hansen, 858 P.2d at 976 (noting that the medical monitoring claim "furthers the deterrent function of the tort system by compelling those who expose others
to toxic substances to minimize risks and costs of exposure"); McCall, supra note 82,
at 989-90 (outlining the societal benefits of recognizing a medical monitoring awards
including ensuring that defendants pay all costs associated with their negligence).
85 For a general discussion of the difference between medical monitoring and
fear of disease claims, see 2 AMERIcAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 380 (1991). In that study, the American Law Institute (ALI) declared
that "treating medical surveillance costs as a compensable harm is not equivalent to
reimbursing individuals for their fear of cancer nor for the pain and suffering associated with increased risk." Id. Furthermore, the ALI supports medical monitoring
awards, but does not support claims for fear of disease presented as "cancerphobia."
Id.
86 It is of course assumed that recovery for fear of cancer ex ante must preclude a
claim for compensation ex post for those unfortunate individuals who actually do
become ill.
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the affected group of individuals-only to detect and forestall adverse
consequences from the toxic exposure.
For those jurisdictions that have recognized medical monitoring
as a cause of action, which stands at slightly more than half of those
jurisdictions that have considered the question, 87 there are two significant issues that bear on the topic of this Article.8 8 The first, although
somewhat more tangential, is the nature of the medical monitoring
claim. The example provided by the Utah court in Hansen makes
clear that the medical response must be an appropriate and distinct
response to the tortious harm, not simply a disguised form of recovering damages. As expressed by the leading opinion in this area, Barnes
v. American Tobacco Co.,8 9 the requirements for medical monitoring
arising out of a mass toxic exposure are
(1) exposure greater than normal background levels; (2) to a
proven hazardous substance; (3) caused by the defendant's negiigence; (4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a sig-

nificantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (5) a
monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the

disease possible; (6) the prescribed monitoring regime is different
from that normally recommended in the absence of the exposure;

87 For thorough recent surveys of the status of medical monit6ring claims across
states, see In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 215-17 (S.D. Ohio
1996); Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438-39 (Nev. 2001) (per curiam)
(summarizing data to show that eleven state courts of appeals and federal courts in
seven more states had recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring); see also
Craig A. Stevens, Casenote, Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army:
The Recovery of Medical Monitoring Costs Under HSCA's Citizen Suit Provision, 10 Vi.L.
ENv'I.. L.J. 201, 208 n.24 (1999) (updating some of the research done in In re Telectronics). In an interesting recent development, the Louisiana State Legislature voiced
its opinion regarding the viability of a medical monitoring claim. 1999 La. Acts no.
989, § 2, http://vv.legis.state.la.us/ leg._docs/99RS/CVT7/OUT/OOOOFVRJ.PDF.
Shortly thereafter the Louisiana Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who were exposed
to asbestos but were not suffering any present injury could recover an award for future medical monitoring in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries,Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 361
(La. 1998), the State Legislature overturned that decision by passing a statute excluding future medical treatment from damage awards. 1999 La. Sess. Law Serv. 989
(West). See generally James E. Lapeze, Comment, Implications of Amending Civil Code
Article 2315 on Toxic Torts in Louisiana,60 LA. L. Rav. 833 (2000) (discussing the effect
of amending article 2315 on medical monitoring claims under Louisiana law).
88 There is one significant matter that is outside the scope of my concern. There
are ongoing disputes in the states on whether medical monitoring is a stand-alone
claim or is simply a remedy for a tort suit. I see this as largely a divide between the
states that have allowed medical monitoring and those that have not, and accordingly,
I do not separately address this question.
89 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1988).
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and (7) the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary
according to contemporary scientific principles. 90
Barnesprovides a structure for allowing a limited form of recovery
to a class of persons who have been exposed to a probabilistic harm,
although it is in the nature of the probability that only a subset will
ever succumb to the harm. What also emerges from the Barnes test is
the departure from the normal concept at law of damages-based recovery. The Barnes factors are designed to allow a medical intervention to forestall a probabilistic harm before it is fully manifest-and
91
before a full tort cause of action would accrue.
The second requirement is that there be a separation between
the recovery to the affected group necessary for medical monitoring
and any individual compensation. A useful distinction may be made
between monitoring as an equitable remedy for a defendant's tortious
negligence, and compensation for individual harms, a classic remedy
at law. This then brings the medical monitoring issue into the center
of this Article. If medical monitoring is found to be an equitable remedy that stands apart from traditional common-law compensatory remedies, then an aggregate claim for probabilistic medical monitoring
should assume the characteristics of the antitrust injunction in Ticor.
As it turns out, this is precisely the distinction that is emerging in the
case law. Returning to the leading case, Barnes, we find a direct instruction that medical monitoring claims be brought as Rule 23(b) (2)
class actions, as a proper example of "those class actions seeking pri92
marily injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief."
Thus, under Barnes, one of the requirements for a medical monitoring claim is that there be a hermetic seal between funds used to pay
for medical surveillance of the affected class and funds used to com90

Id. at 138-39.

91 This is stressed in the testimony of Dr. Troyen Brennan in support of the medical monitoring program created in the fen-phen litigation. Dr. Brennan expressed
the criteria as follows:
(1) asymptomatic progression of disease following toxic exposure; (2) the
existence of a test with high sensitivity; (3) exposed population with relatively high prevalence; (4) the test has a high predictive value; (5) the test is
relatively low cost; (6) monitoring is capable of integration into standard
clinical follow-up of those with disease; (7) monitoring should allow early
preventive care; and (8) monitoring should allow appropriate timing of de-

finitive care.
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at
*167 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000). I must disclose that I worked with Dr. Brennan in the
preparation and presentation of these criteria to the court.
92 Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142 (quoting 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 37, § 4.11, at

4-39).
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pensate plaintiffs in any fashion. According to Barnes, the establishment of a court-supervised program through which class members
would undergo periodic medical examinations in order to promote
early detection of diseases is a "paradigmatic request for injunctive
relief."'93 As such, medical monitoring stands in the same posture toward future damages actions as does the injunctive claim in Ticor.
The difference is that Ticor involved a purely prohibitory injunction,
whereas medical monitoring compels actual payment of the costs of
the monitoring program by the defendant. This is an issue that has
caused some jurisdictions to disallow medical monitoring as a distinct
cause of action. 9 4 But for those that have recognized this relatively
novel claim, the distinction between a prohibitory injunction and one
that obligates the payment of money is more a matter of form than
substance. 95 Any prohibitory injunction compelling the cessation of a
profitable business practice may be costed out and its financial consequences as readily defined as that of a medical surveillance program.
Of more concern is the potential preclusion of subsequent claims
for those individuals who actually succumb to illness. As a matter of
substantive law there is a distinction between the medical monitoring
claim and the anticipatory "fear of cancer." As discussed above, the
latter actually tries to compensate the entire pool of affected persons
on an ex ante rather than ex post basis. There would be no basis for
the actually harmed to then claim to sue again if they were the holders
of the losing lottery ticket. But the medical monitoring claimants
have had no opportunity to seek compensatory damages, either ahead
of time as a probabilistic matter, or subsequently. Therefore, as a mat-

93 Id. at 132.
94 See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that
under West Virginia and Virginia law a claim for medical monitoring is an action for

future damages and therefore requires actual physical injury before a claim against
defendant can be established); Reed v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96-5070, 1997 WL
538921, at *15 (D.C. Super. Aug. 18, 1997) (holding that a medical monitoring claim
is simply a form of damages under traditional common law tort theory of recovery).
95 See, e.g., Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475, 479
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that medical monitoring award is equitable in nature); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845F. Supp. 705, 707 (D. Ariz. 1993) ("[P]laintiffs' request for court-supervised program requiring ongoing, elaborate medical monitoring
of members of class exposed to contaminated groundwater qualified as injunctive
relief."); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 151 F.R.D. 378, 379 (D. Colo. 1993) ("[The]
request for medical monitoring of residents exposed to weapons production facility's
release of radioactive and non-radioactive substances presented request for injunctive
relief.").
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ter of substantive law, there should be no preclusion of a subsequent
96
tort claim.
The procedural law should follow apace. A claim for medical
monitoring should fall exclusively within the confines of a Rule
23(b) (2) class action. It is an injunction seeking to compel an alteration of a defendant's conduct independent of any compensation to
any individual claimant. 97 An individual may choose not to realize the
benefits of a court-supervised monitoring program, just as an individual may choose not to engage in any further transactions with an antitrust defendant whose conduct has been altered under injunction.
But it would have no meaning to allow an individual claimant to "opt
out" since there is no individual claim to pursue separately-just as
there is no such individual claim in any other injunctive action.
Finally, to bring the discussion fully within the Ticor doctrine, it is
important not to overlook the significance of Barnes in confining the
claim for medical monitoring within the Rule 23(b) (2) class action.
Under Rule 23(b) (2), the class action is mandatory, allows no individual discretion to leave and pursue other avenues of redress,9 8 and
does not purport to allow for individual recovery of damages. Accordingly, this procedural device allows the substantive claim for medical
monitoring to achieve its intended goals without compromising the
ability of the actually injured to seek redress.
CONCLUSION

Class actions are necessarily a difficult undertaking. The central
advantage of tailoring the preclusion to the type of class action is that
it allows a class to be defined according to the level of due process
protections owed the absent class members. The line between Rule
23(b) (2) and Rule 23(b) (3) actions is, and has always been, somewhat
muddled. Courts have a difficult time discerning when class actions
should be considered primarily injunctive in nature and when the individual damages component rises to the fore. By focusing on the
preclusive effect of the class action, courts can shift the burden onto
the litigants of properly defining the scope of the class action.
96 See McCall, supra note 82, at 987-90 (arguing that an award for medical monitoring does not preclude a subsequent claim for actual damages).
97
98

See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 131-32.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 n.13 (1998) ("[fln cases

brought under subdivision (b) (1), Rule 23 does not provide for absent class members
to receive notice and to exclude themselves from class membership as a matter of
right.... It is for this reason that such cases are often referred to as 'mandatory' class
actions.").
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This is of particular significance in the settlement context that
has proved so vexing for the courts in recent years. If the parties,
particularly in the settlement context, try to cheat by compromising
the ability to opt out and by short-circuiting the more exacting Rule
23(b) (3) certification standards, then they should be limited in their
claim to have achieved finality. That is ultimately the lesson of Ticor
and the emerging lesson of the medical monitoring case law as well.
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